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CHAPTER 1 
Public Sector Labor Law: 
An Update 
JOHN LUND 
University of Wisconsin-Madison 
CHERYL L. MARANTO 
Marquette University 
Law governing collective bargaining rights of state and local govern-
ment employees continues to be a crazy-quilt patchwork of state and 
local laws, regulations, executive orders, court decisions, and attorney 
general opinions. This patchwork is far from static. For labor relations 
practitioners, academics, and policymakers alike, there is an ongoing 
need to update the status of these laws. That is the objective of this 
chapter. 
To develop this update, a LEXIS® search of state and federal court 
cases, laws, legislative proposals, and attorney general opinions for each 
state was conducted from 1987 (the year the last IRRA research volume 
on the public sector was published) through 1994. Additionally, several 
CD-ROM literature databases, including a legal periodicals database as 
well as the BNA Government Employment Relations Reporter, were 
searched. 
This chapter begins with a review of significant state legislative 
changes as well as selected court deCisions, executive orders, and attor-
ney general opinions since 1987 which affected collective bargaining 
rights in the public sector. We then summarize current legal provisions 
(the duty to bargain, terminal resolution procedures, and strike penal-
ties) by state and sector (police and fire, state workers, etc.). Finally, we 
review and analyze two key post-1987 trends: (1) legislative and consti-
tutionallimitations on the finality of collective bargaining agreements or 
interest arbitration awards and (2) procedures for handling nonmember 
objections to agency shop fees in light of Hudson, 475 US 292, 121 
LRRM 2793 (1986) and Lehnert , III S.Ct 1950, 137 LRRM 2321 
(1991). 
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Major Changes since 1987 
Major State Legislative Changes 
The seven-year period from 1987 to 1994 witnessed a relatively low 
level of legislative activity with only 11 states enacting laws. 1 Only one 
state (New Mexico) passed a comprehensive law granting bargaining 
rights to public employees where no previous bargaining law existed. Ne-
braska's new law extends bargaining rights to state workers, and Texas law 
gives localities the option of providing bargaining rights to police and fire-
fighters. The remaining eight states amended existing bargaining laws at 
the margins, and most (six) of these covered educational employees only. 
Given the low level and limited nature of changes in state collective 
bargaining legislation, it might be tempting to conclude that the legal 
framework in the public sector is quite stable. However, as Hebdon (this 
volume) points out, this apparent stability is largely an artifact of the frag-
mented structure of public sector bargaining law. Our later discussion of 
limitations on the finality of collective bargaining agreements and "binding" 
arbitration awards through judicial decisions and fiscal control measures 
demonstrates that a great deal of flux exists beneath the stable veneer. 
Table 1 summarizes these laws. Changes in administrative regulations 
and proposed legislation are not included. Significant court decisions 
interpreting existing law or regulations, executive orders, and attorney 
... general opinions are reported later. 
Significant Court Decisions Affecting Bargaining Rights 
Since it is not possible to report all Significant court decisions here, 
priority is given to decisions which affected the duty to bargain, terminal 
resolution steps, the right to strike, and the finality of collective bargain-
ing agreements and arbitration awards. Thirteen Significant state court 
decisions regarding public sector bargaining are reported in Table 2. Five 
concern the finality of ratified collective bargaining agreements or inter-
est arbitration awards. These are discussed at some length in a separate 
section on the finality issue. Three decisions relate to the legal status of 
public employee strikes and are discussed in the summary of current state 
law provisions. Finally, two decisions concern the legal status of interest 
arbitration, and the remaining three deal with miscellaneous issues. 
Significant Attorney General Opinions and Executive Orders 
Perhaps the most significant attorney general opinion since 1987 
involves the prohibition of public employee strikes in West Virginia. 
State 
Alaska 
(1992) 
Delaware 
(1994) 
Illinois 
(1995) 
Iowa 
(1991) 
Michigan 
(1994)' 
Nebraska 
(1987) 
New Mexico 
(1992) 
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TABLE 1 
New or Amended State Bargaining Laws since 1987 
Coverage 
Public school 
teachers 
State, county & 
municipal, 
excluding 
teachers, police 
& firefighters 
Public school 
employees, 
Chicago only 
Public school 
teachers 
Public school 
employees 
State workers, 
excluding 
university 
and college 
employees 
All public 
employees 
Summary of Change 
Allows public school teachers the right to strike 
after submitting to advisory arbitration. (A 1982 
Alaska Supreme Court decision had ruled that 
teacher strikes were illegal under the old law. ) 
Expands mandatory subjects of bargaining to in-
clude wages and benefits. 
Expands the list of prohibited bargaining subjects 
(e.g., subcontracting, layoffs and their impact), 
prohibits teacher strikes for 18 months, exempts 
educational employers from requirement to sub-
mit to binding dispute resolution process, gives 
principals sole authority to suspend and disci-
pline teachers, position vacancies to be filled by 
principal without regard to seniority. 
Eliminates fact-finding from available impasse 
procedures. If mediation fails , dispute goes directly 
to final offer arbitration. 
Imposes fmes on employees and unions for strik-
ing, prohibits unfair labor practice strikes, requires 
courts to enjOin strikes and lockouts without find-
ing of irreparable harm, prohibits labor organiza-
tions from vetoing contracts, prohibits requiring 
association ratification, expands the list of pro-
hibited bargaining subjects. 
Twelve statewide bargaining units defined, con-
tracts must expire with end of biennial budget 
cycle, all negotiations must be completed by March 
15. If no agreement by January 15, parties submit 
to binding arbitration (special master) who must 
rule by February 15. Arbitration decisions are ap-
pealable to the Public Employment Relations 
Commission . No right to strike. Also see Appendix. 
State workers are automatically covered by the Pub-
lic Employment Labor Relations Board (PELRB), 
but nons tate jurisdictions may create a parallel 
structure which is at least as effective as PELRB. 
State workers contracts, if not settled by Novem-
ber 15 go to fact-finding, with recommendations 
24 
State 
Pennsylvania 
(1992) 
Texas 
(1993) 
Utah 
(1993) 
Wisconsin 
(1993) 
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TABLE 1 (Continued) 
New or Amended State Bargaining Laws since 1987 
Coverage 
Educational 
employees 
Police and 
firefighters 
only 
Certificated 
school employees 
only 
Certified 
teaching 
personnel 
Summary of Change 
due by December 10. If no agreement by Decem-
ber 15, unresolved issues are resolved by the ap-
propriations process. Nonstate worker units may 
develop alternative terminal resolution procedures. 
Striking unions may be decertified for one year. 
Parties negotiate a terminal resolution arbitra-
tion procedure which selects from either union, 
employer, or factfinder final offers or recommen-
dations, either issue by issue, economic and non-
economic packages, or total package. If fact-find-
ing recommendations not totally accepted by 
both parties, the terminal resolution procedure 
takes effect, and parties give notification of their 
intent to proceed to arbitration which is binding 
unless either party rejects it. If either party re-
fuses to select arbitration, a strike or lockout may 
occur outside of a ten-day notice period. Re-
jection of the arbitration award frees them to 
legally strike or lockout. Strikes are not permitted 
from the time fact-finding is requested until the 
report is made. Strikes must cease when the par-
ties agree to arbitration. Selective strikes are ille-
gal, and strikes which prohibit the school board 
from providing the required number of days in 
the school year may be enjOined. There are re-
strictions on the use of outside strikebreakers. 
Enabling legislation requires cities to adopt the 
law by referendum. Non-binding arbitration avail-
able. Strike penalties include union fmes, forfei-
ture of dues checkoff, and for striking employ-
ees, two years probation and no compensation 
increase for one year after strike. 
Mediation available after 90 days of negotiations 
and if impasse occurs. If no mediated settlement 
within 15 days , parties may submit to a state 
hearings officer for fact-finding. 
A revenue control measure adopted in 1993 
(S.B. 16) amended the Municipal Employment 
Relations Act (MERA) to require that, between 
7/1/93 to 6/30/96, if a school district employer 
offered a "qualified economic offer" to a union rep-
resenting school district profeSSional employees, 
State 
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TABLE 1 (Continued) 
New or Amended State Bargaining Laws since 1987 
Coverage Summary of Change 
the parties would be precluded from arbitrating 
economic issues. A "qualified economic ofle r" 
(QED ) applies only to teachers union and must 
maintain the percentage contribution toward 
employees' existing fringe benefits and maintain 
those fringe benefit costs which existed 90 days 
prior to contract expiration (provided that the 
costs of doing so are plus or minus 1.7% of total 
compensation cos ts during th e pre¥ious 12 
months) and total wage cost increases, including 
length of service and education increments do 
not exceed 2.1 % of total compensation costs dur-
ing the previous twelve months. 
, The circuit court has ordered a stay of implementation of the Michigan law, 
declaring two sections to be unconstitutional (automatic fine of union for strike with-
out determining union authorization and requirement of automatic issuance of 
injunctions against strikes). At this time, the case is on appeal. 
This state currently lacks any legislation establishing the right of public 
employees to bargain collectively. A 1962 state attorney general opinion 
advised "public employees may join unions and government officials 
may discuss wages and hours with such unions, but the final determina-
tion ... rests with the governmental authorities and cannot be delegated 
away" (BNA SLL 1994, 59:220). A 1990 attorney general opinion to the 
state superintendent of schools further advised, "[T]here is no right to 
strike against the state . . , any strike or concerted work stoppage by 
public teachers in this state is illegal." The attorney general stated that 
in the absence of state laws, "[I]t is axiomatic that a strike by public 
employees for any purpose is illegal under common law." In response to 
the ongoing teachers strike, the opinion further advised that teacher 
contracts expressly prohibited strikes; any teacher who participates in 
one is subject to disqualification for one year, may be suspended and 
forfeits ali due process protection (Attorney General opinion, March 8, 
1990). The attorney general opinion conformed to a state Supreme 
Court decision in Jefferson County Board of Education v. Jefferson 
County Education Association, 183 W.Va. 15 (1990), which Similarly 
found the same teachers strike was illegal. 
Perhaps the most Significant executive order during this period was 
issued by Governor Bayh of Indiana in 1990. Although the governor had 
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TABLE 2 
Significant Court Decisions Affecting Public Sector Bargaining Laws since 1987 
State Citation Summary of Decision 
Alaska 
Colorado 
Florida 
Iowa 
Public 
Employees 
Local 71 v. 
State, Supreme 
Court of Alaska, 
775 P.2d 1062 
(1989) 
Martin v. 
Monteztlma-
Cortez School 
Dist., Supreme 
Court of 
Colorado, 841 
P.2d 237 (1992) 
State v. Florida 
Police 
Benevolent 
Assn., Supreme 
Court of 
Florida, 613 So. 
2d 415 (1992) 
AFSCMEllowa 
C otlncil 61 v. 
State, Supreme 
Court ofIowa, 
484 N.W. 2d 
390 (1992) 
The legislature is free to choose not to fund the 
monetary terms of a collective bargaining agree-
ment signed by the state, but then the parties 
may resume negotiations. 
Applies the Industrial Relations Act (initially 
passed in 1915) to public employees and grants 
all public employees the right to strike. Under 
the act, labor disputes are subject to the author-
ity of the director of the division of labor, who 
"may render a final order settling the dispute." 
In Donlon v. Denver Classroom Teachers Assoc., 
Denver Dist. Ct. No. 94 CV 5055 (1994), the dis-
trict court applied Martin to the Denver teachers 
strike, ruling that teachers have the right to strike 
and that the Commissioner of Labor surrendered 
jUrisdiction when he presented a compromise con-
tract which he sought to impose and the union 
rejected. 
Public employee unions requested judicial review 
of the legislature's unilateral changes in leave 
policy in a collective bargaining agreement. The 
court ruled that the legislature is free to under-
fund an agreement (due to separation of powers) 
and, in so dOing, is then free to unilaterally 
change any monetary item in the contract. The 
court rejected the unions' request for renegotia-
tion as being "administratively untenable." 
Unions brought action to enforce an arbitration 
award after the governor vetoed an appropria-
tions bill funding the award . The legislature 
. failed to override the veto. The state contended 
. that it could not fund the awards due to budget 
constraints, and that it was not bound by the 
award because it is subordinate to the appropria-
tions process (due to separation of powers and 
the constitutional prohibition against undue del-
egation of duties) . In ordering the state to pay, 
the court ruled that by passing PERA, the state 
made itself bound by its labor contracts . The 
claimed shortage of funds "can be ascribed to 
discretionary funding choices." 
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TABLE 2 (Continued) 
Significant Court Decisions Affecting Public Sector Bargaining Laws since 1987 
State Citation Summary of Decision 
Louisiana Davis v. Henry , The court ruled that public sector employees are 
Michigan 
Nebraska 
New 
Hampshire 
Supreme Court covered by the state's "Little Norris LaGuardia 
of Louisiana, Act" which protects "all employees in the exer-
555 So. 2d 457 cise of their right to engage in concerted activi-
(1990) ties." The court rejected the school board's argu-
ment that public employee strikes are illegal 
under common law (since Louisiana is not a 
common law state) and found that the state con-
stitution gives public employees "the same right 
to engage in collective bargaining a~ held by 
their counterparts in the private sector." Except 
for police strikes which by their nature endanger 
the public, public employee strikes are legal and 
not enjoinable absent factual findings of danger 
MEA v. Engler, 
Wayne County 
Circ. Ct., 94-
423581-CL 
Nebraska v. 
Nebr. Assn. of 
Public Employees 
Local 61, 
Supreme Court 
of Nebraska 
239 Neb. 653 
(1991) 
Furlough , 
Supreme Court 
of New 
Hampshire, 135 
NH 625 (1992) 
to public health and safety. 
Unions challenged the constitutionality of five 
provisions of new amendments to PERA dealing 
with public school employees. The court found 
two provisions unconstitutional: (1) automatic 
fines against the union without determination of 
union knowledge/support or authorization, and 
(2) requirement of courts to enjoin school strikes 
without finding of irreparable harm. The circuit 
court issued a stay of the entire law's implemen-
tation. Currently on appeal. 
This case arose not out of the bargaining law but 
the state's Uniform Arbitration Act. The union 's 
contract with the state required final and binding 
arbitration regarding terms and conditions of 
employment; a similar clause required binding 
arbitration of grievances. The state supreme 
court found final and binding arbitration of both 
contracts and grievances to be unconstitutional, 
because it ousts the courts of jurisdiction. 
The N.H. Supreme Court was requested by the 
state House of Representatives to determine 
whether a pending bill, HB 1058-FN, which 
would require state employees to take unpaid 
leaves of absence in response to a state fiscal cri-
sis, would violate the state employee collective 
bargaining agreement. The court found the pro-
posed law did impair the collective bargaining 
agreements despite the state's assertion that no 
minimum amount of work was guaranteed. The 
court also rejected the state's argument that such 
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TABLE 2 (Continued ) 
Significant Court Decisions Affecting Public Sector Bargaining Laws since 1987 
State Citation Summary of Decision 
New Jersey 
Oklahoma 
• '" Pennsylvania 
South 
Dakota 
Hillsdale, 622 
A.2d 872 
(N.J. Super, A.D. 
1993) 
Del City v. 
Fraternal Order 
of Police Local 
114, Supreme 
Court of 
Oklahoma, 869 
P.2d 309 (1993) 
Masloff v. Port 
Authority , 
Pennsylvania 
Supreme Court, 
531 Pa. 416 
(1992) 
Rapid City, 
Supreme Court 
ofS. Dakota 
522 N.w.2d 
494 (1994) 
a decision to furlough was within the purview of 
management rights and finally that this action 
was within the "emergency" provisions of the 
contract. The N.H. Supreme Court also rejected 
the proposed bill on constitutional grounds. 
Two police arbitration awards were challenged 
by two cities on the theory that the arbitrators 
did not adequately address all eight statutory cri-
teria governing awards (34:13A-16g). The New Jer-
sey Supreme Court vacated both decisions see 
below). 
Oklahoma's Supreme Court invalidated Sections 
51-65 of the Police and Fire Law which provided 
for an "evergreen" clause allowing negotiated 
settlements to "roll over" for an additional year if 
no contract settlement was reached. The cit)' 
argued that to continue to pay negotiated salaries 
and benefits from the previous fiscal year would 
create a budget deficit which would violate a 
state constitutional provision requiring a three-
fifths referendum to increase indebtedness above 
revenues. The Oklahoma Supreme Court agreed. 
Port Authority transit workers in Pittsburgh 
struck in 1992, and the city of Pittsburgh (not a 
party to the dispute) obtained an injunction cit-
ing a "clear and present danger" to public health 
and safe ty. Two issues were involved in the 
appeal: (1) did the city have standing to file for 
the injunction; and (2) was a clear and present 
danger established? The court ruled that the city 
did have standing to file. Relying upon rulings 
under the PERA, the court found that although 
"[Olrdinary inconveniences resulting from a 
strike don't by themselves establish a clear and 
:present danger," there was one in this case. The 
court ordered the union and the Port Authority 
into court-supervised negotiations only because 
binding arbitration had been removed by a 1986 
amendment to the Port Authority law. 
Under §3-18-8.1 of the South Dakota law, school 
boards may implement their last offer eleven 
days after impasse is reached, unless state inter-
vention is requested. FollOwing impasse, Rapid 
City's board of education implemented its final 
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TABLE 2 (Continued ) 
Significant Court Decisions Affecting Public Sector Bargaining Laws since 1987 
State Citation Summary of Decision 
Texas Beaumont, 
Texas Court of 
Appeals , 763 
SW2d57 
(1992) 
offer, A union's unfair labor practice charge alleged 
one implemented provision of the school board's 
final offer was even more restrictive than state 
law, The state supreme court held this action was 
not an unfair labor practice , 
A city ordinance which originally authorized 
binding inte rest arbitration was subsequently 
repealed by the voters, The union brought suit 
claiming the repealing ordinance conillcted with 
state law by removing the provision for binding 
arbitration, The court of appeals found no con-
flict, since binding arbitration is not required by 
the act. 
promised to pursue legislation providing collective bargaining rights to 
state workers, a bill to do so, as well as two other bills (one relating to all 
public employees and one to police and firefighters only), all failed pas-
sage, The state workers' bargaining bill was withdrawn from considera-
tion in the senate, after passing the house, on the grounds that it might 
necessitate a statewide tax increase, Although the governor lacked the 
jurisdiction to mandate bargaining rights, the executive order grants 
state workers the right to elect union representation. An election will be 
scheduled following a shOwing of sufficient interest. The order prohibits 
strikes, strikers are subject to dismissal, and participating unions lose 
recognition by the state (Government Employment Relations Reporter, 
June 4, 1990, p. 699). Despite the lack of a bargaining duty and the 
absence of terminal resolution procedures, at least three contracts cov-
ering state workers have been negotiated since the order was issued 
(CERR, June 13, 1992, p. 968), 
Current State Collective Bargaining Law Provisions 
The Appendix summarizes the variations in state requirements with 
respect to the duty to bargain, terminal resolution procedures, and strike 
penalties affecting different public employee groups. Here we present 
summary tabulations of the prevalence of those legislative provisions. 
Table 3 reports the prevalence among states of laws which mandate a 
bargaining duty (as defined in Sec. 8{d) of the LMRA) by sector. Eleven 
states continue to have no legislation granting public employees bargain-
ing rights, while twenty-three states and the District of Columbia grant 
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bargaining rights to all public employees, and sixteen states grant bar-
gaining rights to only some public employees. 
TABLE 3 
N umber of States' with Legislative Bargaining Duty, 1994 
Employee Group Number of States 
All public employees 
All but state employees 
Police, firefighters , and education 
Education and municipal 
Education only 
Police and firefighters only 
None 
• Includes the District of Columbia. 
24 
3 
2 
2 
5 
4 
11 
The top panel of Table 4 summarizes strike policies governing public 
employees by sector. Sixteen states have legislation that explicitly pro-
hibits strikes by all public employees, and all but four of these specify 
one or more penalties for striking. Not surpriSingly, police and firefight-
ers are most frequently subject to strike prohibitions (31 states and 
D .C.). State, education, and municipal employees are fairly equally sub-
ject to strike prohibitions (20, 23, and 21 jurisdictions, respectively). 
Police and firefighter strike prohibitions are most likely to have speci-
' .. fied penalties attached (22 jurisdictions), with educational strikes close 
behind (19 jurisdictions). On the other hand, ten states now permit 
strikes by all public employees except police and fire with no or minor 
restrictions.2 One state (Colorado) permits strikes by all public employ-
ees. Three of the states which permit strikes have laws which are silent 
on the issue (in fact, two lack enabling legislation entirely), but their 
state supreme courts have ruled that public employee strikes are legal 
(County Sanitation Dist. No . 2 of L.A. County v. L.A. County Em-
ployees Assoc. , 699 P.2d 835, 838 [1985], in California; Davis v. Henry, 
555 So. 2d 457 [1990], in LO,uisiana; and Martin v. Montezuma-Cortez 
School Dist. , 841 P.2d 237 [1992], in Colorado). 
The type of terminal resolution procedure is summarized in the lower 
panel of Table 4 for each state and sector. (See Appendix for additional 
detail.) The designations in Table 4 reflect the mandatory, explicit, and 
final step of the statutory bargaining dispute resolution procedure; the 
format of the terminal step (e.g., what type of arbitration) is not specified 
here. Unless the statute clearly indicates that the terminal step is manda-
tory, the next lower and mandatory step (e.g., fact-finding or mediation) is 
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TABLE 4 
N umber of States' with Various Strike Policies and Terminal Resolution Procedures 
Police & 
Firefighters State Education 
Number of States with Various Strike Policiesb 
Allowed without 
restriction 2 3 3 
Allowed with 
minor restrictions 1 8 9C 
Prohibited, no penalty 
specified 10 6 4 
Prohibited, with 
penalties specified 22 14 19 
Total states with 
strike policy 35 31 35 
N umber of States by Terminal Resolution Procedure 
Municipal 
3 
9 
7 
14 
33 
Silent 17 23 15 21 
Mediation 5 9 9 9 
Fact-finding 6 13 19 15 
Interest arbitration 22 5 8 6 
Notes: 
• Includes the District of Columbia. 
b The number of states with a strike policy does not equal the number with a leg-
islated bargaining duty because: (1) some laws are silent on strike policy, and (2) 
some states which lack a bargaining law have strike policies established via judicial 
decisions. 
C A new law in Illinois covering only Chicago schools prohibits strikes for 18 
months but is being challenged in the courts. Illinois is still coded as allowing strikes 
in education with minor restrictions. 
reported. In some cases, the law authorizes the parties to jOintly agree to 
a terminal resolution procedure but does not clearly indicate what would 
happen if the parties fail to reach agreement on a terminal step. In these 
cases, the next lower mandatory terminal step is reported in this table. 
A second definitional problem occurs in determining whether the 
terminal step is binding. Clearly mediation and fact-fmding, by defini-
tion, are nonbinding. Interest arbitration is presumed to be binding, but 
in several states, the legislature or governing body has the ability to 
override portions of an arbitration award or portions of the award are 
nonbinding. (For example, in Rhode Island the award is advisory only 
on all economic issues and is binding on noneconomic issues only if a 
majority of the arbitration panel concurs.) Rather than seek to resolve 
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this definitional problem, the lower panel of Table 4 indicates whether 
arbitration is mandatory but not whether the arbitration award is bind-
ing. The diversity of arbitration provisions among states prevents ade-
quately capturing such detail in a summary table. The Appendix pro-
vides such detail. 
As the lower panel of Table 4 indicates, public sector bargaining laws 
are often silent on the terminal dispute resolution procedure, with that 
"silence" being most prevalent for state employees and then for municipal 
employees. When the terminal procedure is speCified, it is most often 
fact-finding, followed by interest arbitration, and then mediation. 
Mandatory interest arbitration is by far the most common terminal reso-
lution procedure for police and firefighters (22 jurisdictions), whereas 
fact-finding is the most common procedure for teachers (19 jurisdictions). 
"Silence" is most common for state and municipal workers, although if a 
terminal resolution procedure is specified for them, fact-finding is most 
common for both groups. Interest arbitration is the least common resolu-
tion procedure for state, education, and municipal employees. 
Finality of Collective Bargaining Agreements and Interest 
Arbitration Awards: Legislative Overrides and Imperatives 
In a period of tightening government budgets and broad public oppo-
sition to tax increases, an issue of increasing importance in public sector 
.~ bargaining is whether and under what conditions the monetary terms of a 
collective bargaining agreement or an arbitration award are binding on 
the employer. Presently there is no clear trend among states on this issue. 
We first review recent court cases and attorney general opinions dealing 
with the question of whether the legislative body can override voluntary 
bargaining settlements or arbitration awards. We then examine recent 
legislation which Significantly alters terminal resolution procedures. 
Four state courts have found that collective bargaining contracts rat-
ified by the state or arbitration awards do not constitute binding obliga-
tions on the state and its legislature, and four state courts and an attor-
ney general's opinion have found that ratified and funded collective 
bargaining contracts or arbitration awards do bind the state, at least 
under the fact situations presented in the cases. Since states have differ-
ent collective bargaining statutes and state constitutions, it is difficult to 
generalize beyond these cases. 
Among the cases in which courts (or the attorney general) found 
that collective bargaining agreements are binding obligations, four are 
based on the contract clause of the U.S. Constitution. Association of 
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Surrogates v. State of New York , 588 N.E.2d 51 (N.Y. 1992), dealt with a 
challenge to a new law that would withhold five days' pay from both 
unionized and nonunionized personnel, to be paid as lump sums when 
employees quit or retired, in order to offset a state budget shortfall. The 
court found that this legislation violated the contract clause of the U.S. 
Constitution, which prohibits states from passing any law impairing the 
obligation of contracts (U.S. Const., Art. I, sec. 10, cl.[1]) . Specifically, 
the court found that the impairment created by the "payroll lag" was 
substantial, inasmuch as the payment deferral could be for many years, 
and that such a measure was not reasonable or necessary to accomplish 
an important state purpose because the state had many alternative ways 
to raise or save revenue. 
In Carlstrom v. State of Washington, 694 P.2d 1 (Wash. 1985), the 
state legislature initially appropriated sufficient money to fund its col-
lective bargaining agreements, then later canceled the wage increases 
contained therein after declaring an economic emergency. The Carl-
strom court found that this law unconstitutionally impaired the collec-
tive bargaining agreements. The impairment was unreasonable given 
that the state was aware of financial problems before entering into the 
contracts and these problems changed in degree but not in kind during 
this period. "An economic emergency may be properly considered, but 
it is just another factor subsumed in the overall determination of reason-
ableness" (694 P.2d 1, 5). Additionally, the Carlstrom court reasoned 
that the state could have, but failed to, include a clause in the contracts 
which speCifically made wage increases contingent on legislative 
approval (although the contracts did state that the agreements are sub-
ject to all present and future acts of the legislature). 
In Furlough , 135 N .H . 625,609 A.2d 1204 (1992), the New 
Hampshire Supreme Court issued an opinion in response to the legisla-
ture's inquiry as to the constitutionality of a proposed law which would 
have required all state employees, including those covered by collective 
bargaining agreements, to take unpaid leaves of absence. The New 
Hampshire court also found that the U.S. Constitution's contract clause 
prohibits states from enacting such a law since the law does constitute a 
substantial impairment, unless it is reasonable and necessary to serve an 
important public purpose. The Furlough opinion concluded that such a 
law was neither reasonable nor necessary, since many alternative means 
of dealing with the fiscal problem were available (though perhaps less 
politically feasible), and because a state cannot consider impairing its 
contract obligations on par with other policy alternatives. 
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In 1989 the Connecticut attorney general (Conn. AG LEXIS 5) was 
asked by the senate president and speaker of the house whether a law to 
decrease or delay COLA adjustments of state employees "notwithstand-
ing existing contracts or pending contract negotiations" would violate 
state or federal law. The attorney general advised that such an enact-
ment would violate the u.s. Constitution's contract clause unless the 
state could show severe fmancial emergency (Le., an important public 
purpose) , that the emergency was not foreseeable when the contract 
was agreed to, and that no alternative methods of meeting the fiscal cri-
sis would have less impact on contractual obligations. These four deci-
sions and the attorney general's opinion suggest that, in the absence of 
specific language in state public sector bargaining laws which conditions 
monetary items of ratified contracts on sufficient legislative appropria-
tions, the contract clause of the u.s. Constitution provides some protec-
tion against abrogation of contractual wage increases and payments for 
which appropriations had been made during the term of the agreement. 
The important role of state public sector bargaining statutory provi-
sions is highlighted by AFSCMElIowa Council 61 v. State of Iowa, 484 
N.W2d 390 (Iowa 1992). This case involved interest arbitration awards 
for state employees which the legislature funded. The governor line-
item vetoed the appropriation funding the awards. The legislature did 
.,!lot override his veto. The unions then petitioned the court for enforce-
- inent of the arbitration awards. The state argued it was not bound by the 
awards because they are subordinate to the appropriations process. Be-
cause of the governor's successful veto, the appropriation was never 
made. The state further argued that the constitutional requirement for 
separation of powers prevents arbitrators, as members of the judiCiary, 
from spending public money. In rejecting these arguments, the Iowa 
Supreme Court ruled that when the legislature passed the Public Em-
ployment Relations Act (PERA) in 1974, it expressly made itself bound 
by its contracts. There is no provision in the Iowa law, as there is in 
other states, which expressly makes the monetary terms of a collective 
bargaining agreement subject to funding through legislative appropria-
tions. Sec. 20.17(6) of PERA states: 
No collective bargaining agreement or arbitrator's decision 
shall be valid or enforceable if its implementation would be in-
consistent with any statutory limitation on the employer's funds, 
spending or budget or would substantially impair or limit the 
performance of any statutory duty by the public employer. 
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The court rejected the state's claim that Sec. 20.17(6) made the con-
tracts unenforceable, given the budget difficulties the state was facing. 
The court found that all limitations or impairments suggested by the 
state were under the control of the state, "[Tlhe shortage of funds , at 
least to the extent of liability on these contracts, can be ascribed to dis-
cretionary funding choices" (484 N.W.2d 390,395). Although the gover-
nor had the power to veto the appropriations bill, this veto did not erase 
the state's obligation. 
Alliance v. Secretary of Administration, 597 N.E.2d 1012 (Mass. 
1992), closely parallelled the fact situation in AFSCME but yielded an 
opposite result. Five collective bargaining agreements were signed by the 
state secretary of administration; the legislature appropriated sufficient 
funds to finance the cost items of the agreement, but the governor 
vetoed the appropriations bill. His veto was not overridden. The Massa-
chusetts Supreme Court found' that, in the absence of the governor's sig-
nature, no valid appropriation was made, so the contracts were not bind-
ing on the state. There are, however, critical statutory and contractual 
differences between AFSCME and Alliance. Unlike the Iowa law, Sec. 6 
of the Massachusetts bargaining law provides, "[Ilf the appropriate leg-
islative body duly rejects the request for an appropriation necessary to 
fund the cost items, such cost items shall be returned to the parties for 
further bargaining." All contracts also stated that the cost items would 
not become effective unless sufficient appropriations were enacted. 
In State of Nebraska v. Nebraska Assoc. of Public Employees Local 
61 (Neb. 1991), the Nebraska Supreme Court declared the state's 
Uniform Arbitration Act unconstitutional. The law authorized binding 
arbitration of future disputes and contract clauses providing for binding 
arbitration. The court found that these provisions violated Article 1, Sec. 
13 of the Nebraska Constitution, which states that "[alII courts shall be 
open, and every person, for any injury done to him in his lands, goods, 
person or reputation, shall have a remedy by due course of law." The 
court cited a long history of cases indicating the Nebraska judiCiary'S 
zealous guarding of their jurisdiction. It is unlikely that other states 
would be influenced by this holding. 
Two cases in Florida and Pennsylvania which found that collective 
bargaining contracts did not bind the public employer have potentially 
far-reaching implications for public sector collective bargaining in those 
states. In State v . Florida Police Benevolent Assoc. , 613 So.2d 415 (Fla., 
1992), the Florida Supreme Court ruled that public employee collective 
bargaining agreements are subject to legislative appropriations. Further, 
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if the legislature fails to appropriate sufficient monies to fund the mone-
tary items of an agreement, it can unilaterally alter any monetary con-
tract provisions without a requirement to return the issues to the parties. 
The court said that requiring further negotiations would be "admin-
istratively untenable." The Florida PBA court effectively skirted the fact 
that public workers also have a constitutional right to bargain collectively 
in Florida. Art. 1, sec. 6 of the Florida Constitution states: "[T]he right of 
employees, by and through a labor organization, to bargain collectively 
shall not be denied or abridged." The court reasoned that allOwing the 
legislature to unilaterally change contract terms does not abridge collec-
tive bargaining rights but instead reflects "an inherent limitation due to 
the nature of public bargaining itself," given the separation of powers 
doctrine (613 So.2d 415,419). 
Florida PBA arguably represents a major departure from Florida 
precedent. In Dade County Classroom Teachers Assoc. v. Legislature of 
Florida , 269 So.2d 684, 685 (Fla. 1972), the Florida Supreme Court 
held that, except for the right to strike, public employees have the same 
right to collective bargaining as do private employees. Furthermore, the 
Dade County CTA court "threatened to impose judicial guidelines if the 
legislature failed to pass" enabling legislation. Thus, historically, the 
Florida Supreme Court had actively encouraged public sector employee 
bargaining rights . Dissenting in the Florida PBA case, Justice Kogan 
noted that the court previously ruled that a refusal of a public employer 
to honor contractual provisions involving money was an abridgement of 
the constitutional right to collective bargaining and, thus, required a 
shOWing of compelling state interest to be sustained (Hillsborough 
County Governmental Employees Assoc. v. Hillsborough County, 522 
So.2d 358 (Fla. 1988). No such shOWing was required in this case. 
However, Florida PBA did not expliCitly overturn Hillsborough, reason-
ing that Hillsborough was inapplicable because the legislative exercise of 
appropriations power is not an abridgement but an inherent limitation 
of public sector bargaining. Justice Kogan stated, 
I would hold that Article' I, section 6 imposes upon the legisla-
ture, at a minimum, a duty to seek renewed negotiations with 
unions whenever the legislature decides to ignore the gover-
nor's negotiated agreement with those unions .... To say oth-
erwise would render Article I, section 6 meaningless for public 
employees (613 So.2d 415, 424) . 
At least three states have used fiscal control measures to impair the 
fmality of collective bargaining agreements or interest arbitration awards 
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or to block access to interest arbitration. In Wilkinsburg Police Officers 
Assoc. v. Commonwealth, 636 A.2d 134 (Pa. 1993), unions challenged 
the constitutionality of the Pennsylvania Financially Distressed Munici-
palities Act, which requires a city so designated to develop a recovery 
plan which may include changes to existing collective bargaining agree-
ments. The law further prohibits future collective bargaining agreements 
which violate a recovery plan's provisions. The law does not mention any 
contracts, other than collective bargaining agreements, in its provisions. 
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court ruled that this law is constitutional, 
despite Art. 3, sec. 32(7) of the Pennsylvania Constitution which reads: 
"The General Assembly shall pass no local or special law .... Regulating 
labor, trade, mining or manufacturing" [emphasiS added] . The Wilkins-
burg court ruled that this prohibition simply requires that a statutory 
classification have a rational relationship to a proper state purpose. It 
found that the purpose of the law is to "ensure fiscal integrity of munici-
palities" and that the classification is rationally related to that purpose 
because only municipalities in poor financial condition are subject to the 
act. The court justified the selective inclusion of collective bargaining 
contracts by noting that by passing the Public Employment Relations Act 
(PERA), the state already regulates labor contracts to the exclusion of 
nonlabor contracts. Justice Papadakos dissented, noting that the law 
"effectively permits municipalities to adopt recovery plans which unilat-
erally determine the limits of future collective bargaining agreements 
and awards (including the reduction in salaries or benefits) without any 
meaningful input by the employee organization" (636 A.2d 134, 140). He 
further suggested the law regulates collective bargaining agreements to 
the exclusion of any other contracts and should be declared unconstitu-
tional: "[T]he Act effectively suspends collective bargaining and places 
all union employees in the category of nonunion, at-will employees of 
the municipality" (636 A.2d 134, 141). 
In Hillsdale PBA Local 207 v. Bourough of Hillsdale, 622 A.2d 872 
(N .J. Super. A.D . 1993), the court found that compulsory public sector 
interest arbitration will not pass constitutional muster unless arbitrators 
confine themselves to a very strict reading of all eight arbitral decision-
making criteria in the statute. The unions argued that the statute gives 
arbitrators considerable discretion, as it states that the arbitrator's award 
must be "based on a reasonable determination of the issues, giving due 
weight to those factors listed in N.J.S.A. 34:13A-16(g) which are judged 
relevant for the resolution of the specific dispute" (622 A.2d 872, 880) 
(emphasis added). The court rejected the unions' argument: 
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Without proper consideration of the legislative standards, pub-
lic interest arbitration may very well be an undue delegation of 
legislative authority. It may be that in public sector interest 
arbitrations the parties fail to present evidence on some fac-
tors .... However, the public interests at stake in public sector 
arbitration are and must be paramount and demand more 
attention to the statutory factors than an unsupported passing 
reference .. . the interest arbitrators must detail in their opin-
ions the specific reasons why an enumerated factor is not 
"judged relevant" (622 A.2d 872,883-884). 
The Hillsdale court took particular aim at the arbitrators' heavy weight-
ing of comparability and minimal weighting of the Local Government 
Cap Law (which prohibits cities from increasing appropriations by more 
than 5% over the previous year) . "Indeed, an arbitrator's consideration 
of a town's Cap situation is mandated by the Constitutional proscription 
against undue delegation of legislative authority to individuals" (622 
A.2d 287, 881). As displeasure with the fiscal impact of interest arbitra-
tion awards grows, more states may turn to the courts to impose a 
stricter adherence to all statutory arbitral criteria, and/or pass revenue 
control laws that directly constrain interest arbitration awards and col-
lective bargaining agreements. 
To our knowledge, to date only Wisconsin has enacted legislation 
"': which Significantly reduces access to existing arbitration procedures. 
Initiated temporarily by Wisconsin Act 16 and made permanent by the 
state budget bill in 1995, school boards can avoid interest arbitration on 
economic issues for professional school employees by offering a "quali-
fied economic offer" (QEO). An offer is a QEO if it contains combined 
salary and benefit cost increases 3.8% above the previous year. Step 
increases must be included in calculating the cost increase. The statute 
requires the parties to use forms developed by the Wisconsin Employ-
ment Relations Commission (WERC) to determine wage and benefit 
cost increases. This law alsO' put a cap on the amount of increase 'in 
school spending, thus, Significantly limiting school boards' ability to pay, 
even in the absence of QEO limits . The 1993 law also contained a sun-
set provision which would have eliminated interest arbitration for all 
muniCipal employees except police departments of large cities, fire 
departments, and city and county law enforcement agencies. Fact-find-
ing would then become the only terminal resolution procedure. Despite 
Significant sentiment in the legislature and by the governor to allow the 
interest arbitration prOvision to sunset, the 1995 budget bill ostenSibly 
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removed the sunset provision, thus restoring interest arbitration in those 
sectors. The bill's final language is so unclear that it can be interpreted 
as repealing interest arbitration for all municipal employees except 
teachers, although this was clearly not the intent. Seizing the opportu-
nity, three counties supported by the Wisconsin Association of Counties 
have filed declaratory judgment actions seeking a judicial determination 
that the compulsory interest arbitration provision of the Municipal 
Employment Relations Act no longer applies to any employees except 
school district professional employees (e.g., Juneau County v. Court-
house Employees Local 1312 AFSCME, Highway Dept. Employees 
Local 569 AFSCME, and Professional Employees AFSCME, Juneau 
County Circ. Ct., 95 CV 214). While these cases are pending (at this 
writing), several counties are refusing to submit interest disputes to 
arbitration. Should the court rule in the counties' favor, it is conceivable 
that the legislature would refrain from reversing the ruling legislatively. 
Agency Shop Fees 
Case Law 
Unions in the public sector, like their private sector counterparts, 
have sought to further their financial and institutional stability through 
union security provisions. Whether referred to as "fair share" or "agency 
shop," these provisions, once negotiated into a collective bargaining 
agreement, require individuals to join the union or remain a nonmem-
ber but pay some agency fee or fee for service, which generally approxi-
mates union dues. While agency shop and fair share clauses have 
become more prevalent in public sector contracts, at least in jurisdic-
tions which do not outlaw such forms of union security (e.g., the so-
called "right-to-work" states), so too have legal challenges from object-
ing nonmembers who have been required to pay fair share dues. 
In this section, the legal framework for challenges by objecting fair 
share payers is briefly reviewed. Two central issues emerge from these 
legal challenges: (1) exactly what union expenses beyond the core func-
tions of collective bargaining and representation are "chargeable" to 
objecting fair share payers, and (2) what procedural safeguards must be 
established by the union to allow objecting fair share payers to receive 
the nonchargeable fees and/or to challenge the reasonableness of the 
union's determination of what is chargeable. We begin with a brief dis-
cussion of these substantive and procedural issues through several U.S. 
Supreme Court decisions. We then review several lower and state court 
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decisions which have applied these precedents to different fact situa-
tions. Concurrent with the development of case law, at least eight states 
have codified many or all of the substantive and procedural require-
ments developed by the U.S. Supreme Court. It seems likely that such 
codification will continue as substantive and procedural issues become 
settled law. 
For workers in the public sector, the Supreme Court confirmed the 
constitutionality of agency shop or fair share fee provisions in Abood v. 
Detroit Board of Education, 431 US 209, 95 LRRM 2411 (1977), where 
several nonmember fair share payers objected that the agency shop pro-
vision interfered with their freedom of association rights under the First 
and Fourteenth Amendments. Relying upon a series of Railway Labor 
Act cases, the Court held that any such interference was constitutionally 
justified, as the "desirability of labor peace is no less important in the 
public sector, nor is the risk of free riders any smaller in the public sec-
tor" (431 US 209, 224). However, the Abood Court limited the use of 
such fair share fees. 
We do not hold that a union cannot constitutionally spend 
funds for the expression of political views, on behalf of politi-
cal candidates or toward the advancement of other ideological 
causes not germane to its duties as collective bargaining repre-
sentative. Rather, the Constitution requires only that such 
expenditures be financed from charges, dues or assessments 
paid by employees who do not object to advancing those ideas 
and who are not coerced into doing so against their will . . . 
(431 US 209, 235--36). (Emphasis added.) 
The Abood Court noted the dividing line between chargeable and 
nonchargeable activities was "somewhat hazier" in the public sector than 
in the private sector but declined to draw any distinction between the two 
types of activities given the lack of evidentiary record. In a later Railway 
Labor Act case, Ellis v. Railtl.!ay Clerks, 466 US 435, 116 LRRM 2001 
(1984), the Court developed and applied two tests to determine whether 
expense categories were chargeable to objecting fair share payers: (1) 
Were the expenditures "necessarily or reasonably incurred for the pur-
pose of performing the duties of an exclusive representative of the 
employees in dealing with the employer on labor-management issues" 
(466 US 435, 448), and (2) Did they "involve additional interference with 
the First Amendment interest of objecting employees, and if so, were 
they adequately supported by government interest" (466 US 435, 456). 
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The U.S. Supreme Court, in Chicago Teachers Locall v. Hudson, 
475 US 292, 121 LRRM 2793 (1986), then further developed procedural 
safeguards to prevent agency fees being used to subsidize ideological and 
political activities by objecting nonmembers. In Hudson the union auto-
matically rebated to all nonmember employees 5% of total dues paid as 
nonchargeable expenses. The union also established an appeals proce-
dure whereby nonmembers could appeal the amount or percentage used 
to determine nonchargeable expenses. The Hudson Court held: 
The constitutional requirements for union collection of agency 
fees include: (1) an adequate explanation of the basis for the 
fee; (2) a reasonably prompt opportunity to challenge-the 
amount of the fee before an impartial decision maker; and (3) 
an escrow for the amounts reasonably in dispute while such 
challenges are pending. 
The Hudson Court clearly stated that the burden is on the objecting non-
member to challenge the determination of what is chargeable. However, 
before this objection can be made, the union must first provide adequate 
information enabling the nonmember to make an intelligent objection. 
In Lehnert v. Ferris Faculty Association, III S. Ct. 1950, 137 LRRM 
2321 (1991), the Supreme Court revisited the chargeability determina-
tion left open in Abood (and partially answered in Ellis): What is the 
dividing line between chargeable and nonchargeable expenses? The 
majority set forth the following three requirements: (1) the expense 
must be germane to collective bargaining, (2) the expense must be justi-
fied by a policy interest in labor peace and avoidance of free riders, and 
(3) it must not Significantly add to the burdening of free speech that is 
inherent in the agency or union shop. 
Lower Court Cases 
A number of federal and state court cases since 1986 have applied 
Hudson and Lehnert to applicable state law and collective bargaining 
situations. In a procedural case, Mitchell v. L.A. Unified School District , 
140 LRRM 2121 (CA 9, 1992), the Ninth Circuit held that affiTTlUltive 
consent of nonmember agency fee payers is not required to protect 
their First Amendment rights; these rights are adequately protected as 
long as they are given the opportunity to object to such deductions. The 
court cited with approval the California Supreme Court's decision in 
Cumero v. Public Employment Relations Board, 132 LRRM 2575, 49 
Ca1.3d 575 (1989), which stated that it was the objecting nonmember's 
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obligation to object. " It must be affirmatively asserted or else it is 
waived" (140 LRRM 2121, 2124). In other words, rebates are given only 
to those fair share payers who object. 
The Mitchell court held the union's notice procedures adequately 
protected First Amendment rights . The union sent two notices to non-
member agency fee payers advising them that they were obligated to 
pay the full fee unless they objected in writing within thirty days to pay-
ing for nonrepresentational union activities and that the cost of union 
representational activities accounted for 84.6% of the agency fee. 
In Albro v. Indianapolis Education Association, 140 LRRM 2406 
(1992), the Indiana Court of Appeals dealt with the substantive issue, 
finding that the teachers union failed to meet its burden of proving the 
proportion of expenses which were chargeable. The union's method of 
establishing chargeable expenses did not provide adequate information 
to enable the objecting nonmember to intelligently challenge the deter-
mination, thus improperly shifting the burden to the objecting non-
member. The Albro court also made detailed delineations among the 
types of expenses which are chargeable, relying on Lehnert. Lobbying 
expenses unrelated to collective bargaining are not chargeable, nor are 
political and charitable contributions, even if they are de minimis in 
amount. Public relations expenses were also found not chargeable, 
despite the union's contention that it may charge for internal public 
relations relating to activities within the bargaining unit. Expenses 
~. incurred by state and national affiliates for litigation not brought on 
behalf of the bargaining unit are not chargeable. "Defensive" organizing 
also failed to survive Lehnert's three-part chargeability standard, as the 
Albro court found no free rider problem associated with defensive orga-
nizing and charging for activities to convince members to remain part of 
the union adds Significantly to the burden on free speech. The expenses 
for prOviding benefits to union members only are not chargeable, and 
expenses for affiliation with state and national bodies are chargeable 
only if these concern activities that the local can prove are otherwise 
chargeable and will ultimately benefit nonmembers of the union. The 
court in Albro also ruled that Lehnert must be applied retroactively. 
A hybrid procedural and substantive case was presented in Browne v. 
WERe , 140 LRRM 2647 (1982), where the Wisconsin Supreme Court 
considered an appeal challenging the Wisconsin Employment Relations 
Commission's (WERC) finding of an unfair labor practice against several 
unions for deducting fair share fees without first providing all the proce-
dural safeguards reqUired under Hudson. On the substantive issue, the 
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union's notice to nonmembers dis aggregated intermediate-level union 
expenses into 38 separate categories , indicating those which were 
chargeable and those which were not. The audited statement of the 
intermediate union body was used to derive a percentage of chargeable 
to total expenses, which was then applied to the local union's expendi-
tures. On the procedural question, the notice to nonmembers stated that 
objecting nonmembers had thirty days following its posting each year to 
object to the use of fair share funds for the payment of nonchargeable 
expenses. The objector would receive advance rebate of this amount. 
Once such an objection was made, 100% of the challenger's fair share 
payments were put in an escrow account. All challenges were consoli-
dated into a single hearing before an impartial arbitrator. The union paid 
the cost of arbitration and bore the burden of proof for the accuracy of 
the charge ability determination. Escrowed amounts were disbursed pur-
suant to the arbitrator's decision. 
Both the nonunion objectors and the union appealed a myriad of 
procedural and substantive questions. Objectors challenged the deter-
mination of the chargeability of certain categories of expenses in light of 
Lehnert. They also challenged the adequacy of procedural safeguards 
(the notice to members, fairness of the hearing, the escrow account) and 
the legality of the employer deducting the full amount of fair share fees 
without ascertaining that the union's procedure incorporates the requi-
site safeguards. 
On the (substantive) chargeability issues, the Browne court held that 
public relations expenses, which involved "public advertising of positions 
on the negotiation of or provisions in the bargaining agreement and rep-
resentation matters," were chargeable. Lobbying for collective bargain-
ing legislation and regulations was chargeable, but lobbying for other 
political, charitable and ideolOgical matters was not. Extra-unit litigation 
dealing with jurisdictional disputes, impasse resolution and concerted 
activity, and collective bargaining was not chargeable based on Justice 
Blaclanun's reasoning that such activities are more akin to lobbying than 
bargaining unless they are "germane" to the affected bargaining unit. 
The Browne court also found organizing expenses to be nonchargeable. 
The Browne court then turned to the procedural issues under 
Hudson . The court did not find any constitutional defect in the union's 
challenge procedure. But it did take exception with the chargeability 
determination, particularly the automatic application of the chargeabil-
ity percentage of the intermediate body to the local union's expenses. 
The court agreed that a random sampling of expenses by an auditor 
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would be sufficient to create a presumption for the percentage; a full-
blown audit would therefore not be necessary to make this determina-
tion for the local union. The court also found fault that the escrow for 
the challengers' fair share fees was totally controlled by the union, rul-
ing that a more independent escrow was required. Finally, the court 
ruled that the employers did not commit an unfair labor practice by 
automatically deducting the fair share fees and that the facts of the situ-
ation warranted a retroactive application of Lehnert. 
In Gwirtz v. Ohio Education Association, 887 F.2d 678, 132 LRRM 
2650 (CA 6, 1989), six nonmember teachers claimed the union's proce-
dure was not constitutionally sound because it failed to prOvide suffi-
ciently detailed financial information supporting the chargeability of 
expense categories. The appellants argued that the notice, which con-
tained the Audited Basic Statement and Audited Supplemental Schedule 
of the intermediate and national bodies shOWing chargeable expendi-
tures, was insufficient, and that the "highest" available level of auditing 
service was required by Hudson. The Sixth Circuit disagreed, arguing 
that Hudson did not require "absolute precision in the calculation of the 
charge to nonmembers" and that the union "need not provide members 
with an exhaustive and detailed list of all its expenditures." Rather, ade-
quate disclosure in such cases requires only "the inclusion of major cate-
gories of expenses, as well as verification by an independent auditor" 
(475 US at 307). 
The Kentucky Supreme Court in Housing AuthOrity of Louisville v. 
Service Employees Local 557, 93-SC-397-DG, 1994 Ky. LEXIS 119 
(1994), let stand an arbitrator's ruling that the employer violated the con-
tract by failing to withhold the full dues amount from nonmembers with-
out speCific written authorization from the nonmember. Relying upon 
Hudson, the Kentucky court held that it is the objecting nonmember (and 
not the public employer) who is responsible for challenging union disclo-
sure regarding chargeable and nonchargeable expenses and that the 
adoption of such procedural :safeguards is a matter between the union 
and the nonmember employees, not the employer and the union. Indeed, 
the "concerns expressed by HAL [the employer] about the constitutional 
rights of its nonunion employees may be well intentioned but lack the 
legal authority reqUired of standing to bring a lawsuit on that basis alone" 
(1994 Ky. LEXIS 119 at 04-5). Moreover, the court stated that the record 
did not establish any indication that the union engaged in any "extraneous 
political or ideological activity of any sort." 
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Two central issues have been addressed in this section: (1) what 
union expenses are chargeable to the objecting fair share payer's dues, 
and (2) what procedural safeguards must be instituted by the union for 
objectors. Chargeability challenges will now be resolved by applying a 
specific fact situation to the .three basic principles set forth in Lehnert: 
(1) the expense must be gennane to collective bargaining, (2) it must be 
justified in terms of labor peace and avoidance of free riders, and (3) it 
must not significantly impair free speech. As can be seen from the 
Wisconsin and Indiana cases, sometimes the same type of expense is 
found to be chargeable by one court yet not by another. Clearly, the 
determination of what is chargeable will turn on the facts in e'idence in 
each case, applying the three-part test of Lehnert. 
The procedural safeguards required for objectors appear relatively 
clear. The union must give adequate written notice to all nonmembers, 
with sufficiently detailed information to make an intelligent decision 
whether to challenge the chargeability percentage. However, this infor-
mation need not be the most detailed that is available. Estimates of 
chargeability from one level of the union applied to another will not 
meet the standard if Browne is applied. Rather, a same-level audit is 
required. Further, the challenged funds must be escrowed by a third 
party, a hearing must be held in which the evidence is considered, and a 
neutral third party must make a ruling. Any awards will probably be 
applied retroactively. Finally, the employer need not assess the ade-
quacy of the procedural safeguards or the chargeability determination. 
State Laws Dealing with Agency Shop Objectors 
At least eight states have already codified procedures for how agency 
fee objectors will recover rebates for nonchargeable expenses under 
Lehnert and Hudson. These provisions appear to incorporate the sub-
stantive and procedural prinCiples elaborated in the decisions reviewed 
above, with some variation. Pennsylvania's law, which became effective 
in June 1993 requires that as 
a precondition to the collection of fair share fees, the exclusive 
representative shall establish and maintain a full and fair pro-
cedure, consistent with constitutional requirements, that pro-
vides nonmembers, by way of annual notice, with sufficient 
information to gauge the propriety of the fee and that responds 
to challenges by non members to the amount of the fee. The 
procedure shall provide for an impartial hearing before an 
arbitrator to resolve disputes regarding the amount of the 
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chargeable fee. A public employer shall not refuse to carry out 
its obligations on the grounds that the exclusive representative 
has not satisfied its obligation under this subsection. 
If a challenge is filed, the union must pay for the arbitration, which will 
be conducted pursuant to American Arbitration Association rules . 
Moreover, use of this procedure does not preclude constitutional chal-
lenge. Finally, the law requires that all materials and reports filed pur-
suant to it are public records, and violations of these provisions are sub-
ject to a fine of not more than $2,000. 
Under New Jersey law, the representation fee for nonmembers covered 
by an agency shop provision cannot exceed "85% of the regular member-
ship dues, fees and assessments." The law further establishes a "demand 
and receive" provision whereby any objecting nonmember can demand 
a return of any part of that fee paid by him or her which rep-
resents the employee's additional pro rata share of expendi-
tures by the majority representative that is either in aid of 
activities or causes of a partisan political or ideological nature 
only incidentally related to the terms and conditions of em-
ployment or applied toward the cost of any other benefits avail-
able only to members of the majority representative. The pro 
rata share subject to refund shall not reflect however the costs 
of support of lobbying activities designed to foster policy goals 
in collective negotiations and contract administration or to 
secure for the employees represented advantages in wages, 
hours and other conditions of employment in addition to those 
secured through collective negotiations. 
The demand and receive system provides that nonmember objectors 
may obtain review of the chargeable and nonchargeable amounts by a 
three-member review board whose members are appointed by the gov-
ernor. The burden of proof falls on the union. 
In Ohio, under §4117.09(c) of the public sector bargaining statute 
passed in 1983, all public sector labor organizations representing public 
sector employees must devel~p an internal procedure to determine the 
rebate which conforms to federal law and where a timely demand is 
made by the member. This section further provides that objecting non-
members not satisfied with the determination may appeal it within 
thirty days to the State Employment Relations Board which will rule 
whether the determination was arbitrary or capricious. 
California's Dills Act, Section 3515.8 protects the right of an object-
ing fair share payer to demand and receive any part of the fee "used for 
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partisan politics or ideology incidentally related to terms or conditions of 
employment." Costs of lobbying to promote policy goals or to secure im-
provements in wages, hours, and working conditions, in addition to those 
which are negotiated, are not subject to refund, according to the law. 
In Delaware, Section 4019 of the Public School Employment Rela-
tions Act gives school districts authority to deduct fair share fees from 
noncertified personnel. It requires an "adequate explanation" of the basis 
for the fee, an opportunity to challenge the fee amount before an impar-
tial decisionmaker, and further requires that an escrow account be used 
to deposit amounts in dispute. 
Hawaii's law permits payroll deductions of nonmember fees only if 
the union has a procedure for determining the amount of rebate based 
on the pro rata share of expenditures of a political or ideological nature. 
The law provides a right to petition to object to the amount refunded. 
Section 115 of the Illinois Education Labor Relations Act provides 
that fair share fees must exclude fees used for political purposes. When 
an employee objects, the fair share amount must be placed in an escrow 
account. 
Finally, Massachusetts requires unions to establish a rebate proce-
dure based on: (1) the pro rata share of expenditures on political contri-
butions; (2) lobbying on legislation not directly related to the bargaining 
unit; (3) charitable, religiOUS or ideological contributions; and (4) bene-
fits not germane to governance or duties as the bargaining agent. 
At least eight states have sought to codify to some extent the proce-
dural safeguards set out in case law. Additionally, some states have 
expliCitly identified what expenses are chargeable (Illinois, New Jersey, 
and California); some utilize more general guidelines, and others con-
tain no gUidelines at all. The development of procedural safeguards in 
state law appears to mirror developments in the case law, including 
notice requirements and development of internal union procedures. 
The development of state law and administrative regulations help 
unions bring their own internal procedures into line with case law. 
While it is difficult to predict the future, it is likely that several other 
states will follow suit, either through administrative rules or legislation. 
Summary and Conclusions 
Only eleven states have enacted new legislation governing public 
sector bargaining since 1987, and most laws have applied to only one or 
two sectors. Seven of these laws can be characterized as enhanCing col-
lective bargaining rights. Only one state (New Mexico) passed enabling 
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legislation covering all public sector employees during this period. Edu-
cation has received the most legislative attention: Six laws relate solely 
to education, and five focus on terminal resolution procedures for teach-
ers. Currently 39 states have enabling legislation for at least one sector, 
and 23 states and the District of Columbia have laws covering all public 
employees. Education is most likely to have enabling legislation (36 juris-
dictions) , followed by police and fire (33), municipal (29), and finally 
state employees (24). Forecasting future legislative developments is 
always hazardous. If the pattern of activity over the last decade were to 
continue, we would see primarily marginal increases in coverage, ex-
panding to previously uncovered sectors. Such expansion of coverage is 
likely to encounter obstacles, as in Nevada, where the governor vetoed 
enabling legislation for state workers, and in Indiana, where the gover-
nor issued an executive order providing less than full bargaining rights 
when he was unable to get enabling legislation adopted for state work-
ers . Indeed, coverage is likely to continue to lag most for state workers 
as it is the sector in which the old obstacle of nondelegation of authority 
continues to exert the most influence. 
There is no discernible trend in the legal treatment of strikes in the 
public sector. Indeed, since 1987 the right of public employees to strike 
has been enhanced in at least three states (legislatively in Alaska and 
judicially in Colorado and Louisiana) and prohibited in three (legisla-
... tively in New Mexico and Texas and judiCially in West Virginia). The 
judicial activity is particularly intriguing in this area. Absent enabling 
legislation, the Colorado and Louisiana Supreme Courts have granted a 
very broad right to strike to public employees by extending laws previ-
ously thought to apply only to the private sector (the Industrial Rela-
tions Act in Colorado and the "Little Norris-LaGuardia Act" in Louisi-
ana) to the public sector. Equally interesting is the absence of legislative 
initiatives in these states to reverse these decisions. In stark contrast, the 
West Virginia Supreme Court found no public employee right to strike, 
in the absence of enabling' l~gislation, through the application of cam-
mon law. It is particularly difficult to predict future trends in this area, 
given such widely opposing developments. 
Twenty-one states and tlle District of Columbia now have mandatory 
arbitration for firefighters, and twenty have it for police. There is con-
siderable diversity in the type and choice of terminal resolution proce-
dures used. For example, choice of arbitration methods is a feature of 
the laws in Ohio and Pennsylvania, among others, and several states now 
permit the parties to include the fact-finder recommendations as one 
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package of three from which the arbitrator may choose. There has been 
relatively little legislative action on interest arbitration. 
The status of the finality of ratified collective bargaining agreements 
and arbitration awards appears to be one area with a great potential for 
change. While the contract clause of the u.s. Constitution appears to 
provide at least some protection against the abrogation of ratified and 
funded collective bargaining agreements, there appears to be little or no 
legal safety net for ratified contracts or even arbitration awards before 
they are funded through the appropriations process (the Iowa case 
being a notable exception). The right of the legislature to refuse to fund 
economic items in ratified contracts or "binding" arbitration awards is 
legislatively established in a number of states, including Alaska, Con-
necticut, Florida, and Rhode Island. But the Florida case which allows 
the legislature to unilaterally change economic items in ratified agree-
ments which they underfund suggests even greater vulnerability for col-
lective bargaining itself, should other state courts choose to adopt it as 
precedent. Binding interest arbitration may also come under increasing 
assault, both legislatively and judicially. Wisconsin's new law limits 
access of teachers to the arbitration process by effectively imposing a 
specified rate of increase (through its definition of a "qualified economic 
offer"). The law's confusing language has opened the doors to a legal 
challenge to interest arbitration for all nonteacher employees. Judicially, 
the New Jersey case, which requires a rigidly strict adherence to all arbi-
tral criteria in the statute as well as the Local Government Cap Law, 
also provides a potential precedent which other state courts could adopt 
in order to limit the latitude and, thus, the fiscal impact of interest arbi-
tration awards. A number of states have passed fiscal control measures 
which Single out collective bargaining agreements. The Pennsylvania 
court upheld such a law which restricted both current and future collec-
tive bargaining agreements. 
A number of federal and state court cases decided since Lehnert and 
Hudson have addressed a myriad of fact situations dealing with proce-
dural and substantive issues involved in dues rebates for objecting fair 
share payers. A significant number of states have passed laws governing 
this process, and so far, these laws have been applied without Significant 
legal challenge. It appears that litigation over rebate amounts and pro-
cedures will diminish as more states pass such laws. 
Education has been the focus of legislative changes over the last 
seven years, presumably because the direct impact of educational 
spending on property taxes has generated the strongest fiscal pressures 
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in that sector. The impact of impending federal budget cuts and the 
simultaneous devolution of responsibility for the administration of wel-
fare-related programs to the states with less federal money will surely 
increase the fiscal pressures on states. Thus it is reasonable to predict 
that legislative attention will turn increasingly to the state sector. It is 
also likely that fiscal control measures focused on the local level which 
single out collective bargaining agreements (such as those in Pennsyl-
vania and New Jersey) will become more common in the future. 
Endnotes 
I Virginia passed a law in 1993 which expressly prohibits public employee bar-
gaining despite the law's redundancy with a 1977 Virginia Supreme Court decision 
that local governing bodies could not negotiate in the absence of express statutory 
authority (Partridge, in press). Since this law does not enable bargaining, it is not 
included in the above count of new statutes or their summary below. 
2 Minor restrictions include requiring a notice period before striking and the possi-
bility of an injunction in cases of clear and present danger to public health and safety. 
Sector: 
Police and firefighters 
State employees 
Primary and secondary 
school teaching and 
nonteaching personnel 
Municipal employees 
Duty to bargain: 
APPENDIX 
Definitions for Appendix Table 
Primarily sworn and/or uniformed officers, excluding 
state police and nom worn police and fire employees 
such as dispatchers. 
All employees of the state, except employees of a 
higher education and/or community college system. 
Noted where nonteaching personnel are excluded 
from coverage. 
EmpJoyees of municipal and county government, ex-
cluding police and fire employees. 
This is an either/or proposition as to whether the law 
provides for a bargaining duty at least as extensive as 
that under Section 8(d) of the Labor-Management 
Act of 1947, as amended. Does the law impose the 
duty to meet and confer at reasonable times over 
wages, hours, and other conditions of employment 
and a good faith duty to bargain? If any of these ele-
ments are missing, this sector was listed as "no." 
Terminal resolution 
procedures': 
0= 
1 = 
2= 
3= 
4= 
5= 
6= 
7= 
8 = 
9= 
10= 
11= 
12 = 
13 = 
Strike penalties: 
0= 
1 = 
2= 
3= 
6= 
7= 
8= 
9= 
10 = 
11= 
12 = 
13 = 
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No provision explicitly mentioned. 
Mediation. 
Voluntary fact-finding. 
Mandatory fact-finding. 
51 
Fact-finding with review/override by legislative body. 
Final-offer interest arbitration-total package. 
Final-offer interest arbitration-economic and non-
economic packages. 
Final-offer interest arbitration-issue by issue. 
Interest arbitration---other format. 
Interest arbitration--choice of procedures._ 
Parties determine terminal resolution procedure. 
Final resolution by legislative body. 
Other method. 
Voluntary arbitration. 
No provision explicitly mentioned. 
Strikes allowed without restriction. 
Strikes allowed following notice period. 
Strikes allowed but with the possibility of injunctions 
where clear and present danger to public health and 
safety exists . 
Strikes prohibited with no explicit penalties. 
Strikes prohibited with injunctions specifically men-
tioned. 
Strikes prohibited with employee fines. 
Strikes prohibited with employee discipline. 
Strikes prohibited with fmes against union. 
Strikes are possible unfair labor practices. 
Union loses payroll deduction if illegal strike. 
Bargaining duty suspended if union engages in illegal 
strike. 
Union decertified if illegal strike. 
Other. 
• To the extent possible, this is the single code which best characterizes the pres-
ent state of the law 
. f 
APPENDIX TABLE '" ~
Summary of Current Features of State Public Sector Bargaining Laws, by Sector 
Police & Firefighters State Employees PIS Education MuniCipal 
State BD' TRpb SP" BD' TRpb SP" BD' TRpb SP" BD' TRpb SP" 
AL Nol 0 7 No N/A N\A No N/A N/A Nol N/A 4 
AK Yes 8 5 Yes 13 12 Yes 13 13 Yes 13 F 
AZ No N/A N/A No N/A N/A No N/A N/A No N/A N/A ." c:: 
AR No N/A N/A No N/A N/A No N/A N/A No N/A N/A 1:1:1 t"" 
.... 
CA Nol 0 4 Nol 1 34 Yes 2 34 Nos 1 34 ~ 
CO No N/A 16 No N/A 16 No N/A 16 No N/A 16 CIl trI 
77 ~ CT Yes 7 4 Yes 4 Yes 7 5 Yes 7 4 .., 0 
DE Yes 2 5,6,8 Yes 2 5,6,8 Yes 2 5 ,6,8 Yes 2 5,6,8 
== 
DC Yes 5B,-r 5,9 Yes 5B,-r 5,9 Yes 5B,-r 5,9 trI ::: 
FL Yes 10,11 3,11 5,6,7,8, Yesll 3,11 5 ,6,7,8, Yes ll 3,11 5,6 ,7,8, Yes ll 3,11 5 ,6,7,8, 
." 
t"" 
9,10,12 9,10,12 9,10,12 9,10,12 0 ~ GA Yes l2 1213 4 No N/A 714 No N/A N/A No N/A N/A trI 
HI Yes 8 5 Yes 3,13 2,3 Yes 3,13 2,3 Yes 3,13 2,3 ~ 
ID Yes l2 3 115 No N/A N/A Yes IS 2 417 No N/A N/A 
IL Yes 7 4 Yes 2 2,3 Yes 2,13 2,3 Yes 2 2,3 
IN NOIB N/A N/A NOl9 0 7,12 Yes20 3 10 NOIB N/A N/A 
IA Yes 3,7 5 ,6,7,8, Yes 3,7 5 ,6,7,8, Yes 7 5 ,6,7,8, Yes 3,7 5 ,6,7,8, 
9,10,12 9,10,12 9,10,12 9,10,12 
' BD = bargaining duty, ~RP = terminal resolution procedure, CSP = strike penalties 
APPENDIX TABLE (Continued ) 
Summary of Current Features of State Public Sector Bargaining Laws, by Sector 
Police & Firefighters State Employees PIS Education Municipal 
State BD TRP SP BD TRP SP BD TRP SP BD TRP SP 
KS NOl.2 l 3,11 5,9 Nol 3,11 5,9 Yes22 3,11 5,9 N0 1.2l 3,11 5,9 
KY Yesl2 2 4 No N/A N/A No N/A N/A No N/A N/A 
LA No N/A 4 No N/A 36 No N/A 36 No N/A 36 
ME Yes 2,1323 9 Yes 2,1323 9 Yes 2,1323 9 Yes 2,1323 9 
MD No 1 2.24 0 0 No N/A N/A Yes 2 10,12 Yes2.5 3 10,12 
MA Yes 9 5 Yes 3,13 5 Yes 3,13 5 Yes 3,13 5 5 MI Yes 78 4 Yes 1 4 Yes 1 4 Yes 1 4 
226 226 226 
0 
MN Yes 9,13 9 Yes 9,13 Yes 9,13 Yes 9,13 
" MS No N/A N/A No N/A N/A No N/A N/A No N/A N/A ~ MO No N/A N/A Nol N/A 4 No N/A N/A Nol N/A 4 
MT Yes 8 0 Yes 3,13 0 Yes 3,13 0 Yes 3,13 0 
NE Yes 1,227 4 Yes 127 4 Yes 1,227 4 Yes 1,227 4 
NV Yes 8 6,7,8 No N/A N/A Yes 8 6,7,8 Yes 3 6,7,8 
NH Yes 4 4,9 Yes 4 4,9 Yes 4 4,9 Yes 4 4,9 
NJ Yes 9,10 0 Yes 3 1 Yes 3 1 Yes 3 1 
NM Yes 3 5,12 Yes 4 5,12 Yes 4 5,12 Yes 4 5,12 
NY Yes 8 6,8,10 Yes 4 6,8,10 Yes 4 6,8,iO Yes2B 4 6,8,10 
NC No N/A N/A No N/A N/A No N/A N/A No N/A N/A 
ND No N/A N/A No N/A N/A Yes29 3 6 No N/A N/A 
'" .., 
APPENDIX TABLE (Continued ) til 
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Summary of Current Features of State Public Sector Bargaining Laws, by Sector 
Police & Firefighters State Employees PIS Education Municipal 
State BD TRP SP BD TRP SP BD TRP SP BD TRP SP 
OR Yes 7 5 Yes 3,10 2,3 Yes 3,10 2,3 Yes 3,10 2,3 
OK Yes 530 6 No N/A N/A Yes 3 6,11 No N/A N/A 
OR Yes 8 4 Yes 3,13 2,3 Yes 3,13 2,3 Yes 3,13 2,3 "C c::: 
PA Yes 8 0 Yes 3,13 3 Yes 9,10 3 Yes 3,13 3 ~ t"' 
RI Yes 8 4 Yes 831 4 
.... 
Yes 831 4 Yes 831 4 C"l 
SC No N/A N/A No N/A N/A No N/A N/A No N/A N/A ~ t!\ 
5,6,8 5,6,8 C"l SD Yes No 1 Yes I ,ll 5,6,8 Yes 5,6,8 >-l 
0 
TN No N/A N/A No N/A N/A Yes32 3 5,9 No N/A N/A ~ 
TX Yes33 8 6,8,10 No N/A N/A No N/A N/A No N/A N/A t!\ ~ 
UT No N/A N/A No N/A N/A Yes 3 0 No34 N/A N/A "C t"' 
vr Yes 3,13 3,9 Yes 5 9 Yes 4 3 Yes 3,13 3,9 0 ~ VA No35 N/A N/A No35 N/A N/A No35 N/A N/A No35 N/A N/A t!\ 
WA Yes 8 5,8 No36 4 4 Yes 3,13 0 Yes 3,4 4 ~ 
WV No N/A N/A No N/A N/A No N/A N/A No N/A N/A 
WI Yes 9 5,6,8,1 Yes 3 6,9 Yes37 5 5,6,8,10 Yes 5 5,6,8, 
0 10 
WY Yes l2 8 0 No N/A N/A No N/A N/A No N/A N/A 
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Notes: 
1 Right to present proposals/meet and confer. 
2 Excludes snow removal, public utility and sanitation workers, jail, prison and 
hospital employees. 
3 Requires majority vote plus submission to advisory arbitration before a strike. 
4 The laws are silent on the right to strike, but a 1985 Cal. Sup. Court decision 
ruled that public employee strikes (other than firefighters and law enforcement per-
sonnel) are not unlawful at common law unless or until a substantial and imminent 
threat to health and safety is clearly demonstrated. (County Sanitation Dist. No. 2 v. 
L.A. Coonty Employees Assoc., 1985 ). 
5 Although the Meyes-Milias-Brown Act states that Memoranda of Agreement 
(MOUs) are not binding, the Cal. Sup. Ct. ruled in 1975 that a city council's ratifica-
tion of an MOU bound the city to grant the wage increases contained in the MOU 
(City Employees Assoc. v. City of Glendale, 1975). However, a 1991 AG opinion cites 
a 1978 Cal. Sup. Ct. case as stating that the meet and confer "process is not binding" 
(L.A. County Civil Service Comm. v. Superior Court, 1985). 
6 In 1992 the Colorado Supreme Court ruled, in Martin v. Montezuma-Cortez, 
that public employees have the right to strike. In 1990 the Louisiana Supreme Court 
ruled in Davis v. Henry that public employees have the right to strike. 
7 Connecticut State Employees Relations Act provides for interest arbitration 
awards, which can be rejected by the legislature if it finds insufficient funds . The 
parties then resume negotiations. 
B Economic items. 
9 Noneconomic items. 
10 Police and firefighters may be determined by PERC to be managerial employ-
ees exempted fTOm coverage. 
11 The right of public employees to bargain collectively is a constitutional as well 
as a statutory right . 
12 Firefighters only. 
13 Called mediation but like fact-finding. 
14 While there is no law conferring the right of state employees to bargain, there 
is a law which specifically prohibits state employees from striking. 
15 The Idaho Supreme Court ruled that, while strikes during the contract are 
specifically prohibited by law, firefighters have a "residual right" to strike after the 
expiration of a contract (Firefighters v. City of Coeur d'Alene, 100 LRRM 2079, Id. 
Sup. Ct., 1978). 
16 Covers certificated professional employees only. 
17 No mention in law regarding strikes, but a 1977 Idaho Supreme Court decision 
ruled that strikes are illegal under the law, though such illegality does not automati-
cally require issuance of an injunction (Oneida School Dist. v. Education Assn. , 95 
LRRM 3244, Id. Sup. Ct. , 1977). 
18 Indiana's Public Employees Collective Bargaining Act was declared unconstitu-
tional in 1977 because it prohibited judicial review of IERB's bargaining unit deter-
minations. It was formally repealed in 1982. 
19 Governor Bayh issued an executive order on May 20, 1990 granting state 
employees the right to elect union representation. 
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20 Only salary, wages, hours, and wag~-related fring~ ~enefits are mandatory sub-
jects of bargaining. Other working conditions are permissive. 
2 1 Contains a "local option" provision. Political subdivisions (other than the state) 
must elect to be bound by the provisions ofPERA. 
22 Though the law says "meet and confer," the state supreme court ruled the law 
requires negotiation and, that once a contract is ratified, the parties are bound by it 
(NEA v. Shawnee Mission Board of Ed. , 84 LRRM 2223, Kan. Sup. Ct. 1973). 
23 Arbitrator's award regarding economic issues is advisory; if majority of arbitra-
tors on panel agree to the award on noneconomic issues, it is binding. 
24 Permits voluntary collective bargaining. 
25 Covers city of Baltimore only. 
26 Minnesota: Other conditions for lawful strikes include prior participation in 
mediation and neither party has requested interest arbitration. State employees may 
also strike if the legislature rejects or fails to ratifY a negotiated agreement or arbitra-
tion decision. 
27 Nebraska: The Nebraska State Supreme Court has ruled that contractually 
based and statutory binding arbitration-both interest and rights types-under the 
State Uniform Arbitration Act, are an unconstitutional intrusion into the authority of 
the courts (see AFSCME Local 61 infra.). 
28 New York: New York City has its own ordinance which allows submittal of 
impasse items to final and binding arbitration. 
29 North Dakota: Applies to teachers only. A binding interest arbitration referen-
dum was defeated in 1992. 
30 Oklahoma: If the city's final offer is not accepted by the factfinder, the city may 
submit its last best offer to the voters in a referendum. 
3 1 Rhode Island: All interest arbitration awards are advisory only on wages. 
32 Tennessee: Applies to certificated school employees only. 
, ""; 33 Texas : Each municipality must fust enact an ordinance authorizing police and 
firefighter bargaining. This ordinance may include final and binding interest arbitration. 
34 Utah: While there is no law authoriZing municipal employee bargaining, Salt 
Lake City does have a local employee bargaining ordinance. 
35 Virginia: The law provides, "No state, county, municipal or like governmental 
officer, agent or governing body is vested with or possesses any authority to recognize 
any labor union or other employee association as a bargaining agent of any public 
officers or employees or to collectively bargain or enter into any collective bargaining 
contract with any such union or association or its agents with respect to any matter 
relating to them or their employment or service." 
In 1993, a section was added to permit the formation of employee associations 
"for the purpose of promoting their interest before the employing agency." Teachers 
and public employees have a grievance procedure established by statute. 
36 Washington: State employees cannot negotiate wages. There is also a separate 
law for marine employees covering employees of the Washington State Ferry System 
which has its own Marine Employees Board which prOvides research, grievance 
administration and fact-finding assistance. 
37 Wisconsin : In 1993 the law was amended to cap the total economic package 
that could be accepted by an arbitrator at 3.8% per year (see Table 1). 
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